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The right to recognition, also known as the right to legal personality, would seem like the natural starting-place for the debate over whether a suspected terrorist has legal standing in international law. While one finds debates about the suspects' standing in the national jurisprudence of many countries, however, one looks in vain in the post-9/11 jurisprudence produced by international courts and treaty bodies for an explicit analysis of the relevance of this right to 9/11 suspects. The absence is likely due to the history of the right's usage in earlier decisions, where it had typically been cited in reference to questions far removed from the context of terrorism.
The concept of legal personality was developed in the seventeenth century by Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. It emerged in order to give "personhood" status to organized groups-which entailed bequeathing upon the legal person will and agency, manifested in the legal person's ability to make contracts, own property, sue in court-to exercise civil rights as if it were an individual. In the Westphalian model, the preeminent legal person was the state. 3 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the corporation was granted full personhood status; in the twentieth, the non-governmental organization were granted elements of that status as well.
While the organizational model gained force, however, the definition of legal personality began to take a new turn at the start of the twentieth century-from the organizational person toward the individual person. During the establishment of the League of Nations, the legal person, for purposes of international jurisprudence, began to be identified with the individual human person. The legislative history of the right's 5 applicability of humanitarian or human rights provisions, those provisions must be extended to those whose status is doubtful; 3) restricted derogation, that during threats to the life of a nation, which permit states to restrict or suspend certain human rights, derogability is limited to specific rights, and even then the freedom to derogate must conform to strict protocols regulated by law; and 4) regulated detention, that detention of suspected terrorists must comply with the prescriptions of both human rights and humanitarian law. The right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law is a useful staging ground from which to examine how these four principles have begun to be applied.
The right to recognition becomes significant after 9/11 in the context of three distinct theories regarding the rights of terrorist suspects. Here, "theory" refers to a consistent approach to legal argument and policy-making on the basis of a set of explicitly articulated principles. The Bush administration's theory-what its critics have dubbed the "legal black hole" theory-suggests that suspected terrorists of global reach
are not addressed by current international law, necessitating the creation of new law that offer substantially fewer protections for such suspects. The black hole theory has been answered by two alternatives that could be called the "full coverage" and "evolutionary"
theories. The full coverage theory argues that suspected terrorists do find a place in both IHL and IHRL, which in their current form adequately address the challenge al Qaeda suspects represent. The evolutionary theory seeks a middle ground, recognizing facets of global terrorism that are beyond the reach of current law, but seeking principles from within the law with which to extend it. Because they do not fall into the categories currently prescribed by IHL, the Bush administration decided that they were not due the prisoner of war protections guaranteed to combatants. These protections include the right to challenge their detention in a regularly constituted court, as specified by common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Flynn, to ensure visibility, and instituted a set of routine and recursive procedures, through its Preliminary Implementation Assessment, to monitor each state's compliance, carry out country visits, provide technical assistance, and engage in dialogue with states about the extent to which their counter-terrorism measures complied with IHL and IHRL. 21 Ironically, although human rights are still the poor stepchild in the CTC, the backlash against the "war on terror" has produced closer ties between the UN's security and human rights apparatuses, which has appreciably strengthened monitoring of states'
compliance. In reaction to the "war on terror," the Security Council has become, for the first time in its history, a human rights organization.
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Full Coverage
International law supporters who opposed the legal black hole theory produced an alternative that could be called the "full coverage" theory, which asserts that IHL and IHRL do provide guidelines (i.e., the principles of complementarity, maximal extension, restricted derogation, and regulated detention outlined above) that, together, enable an (2008) argued that any reforms that need to be made are not to the law but to the "delivery systems;" hence, he has criticized the new international courts as slow, expensive, inefficient, corrupt, and prone to giving grandstanding defendants airtime. 38
In sum, the full coverage theory maintains that whatever challenges global terrorism poses to IHL and IHRL can be met with complementarity, maximal extension, and restricted derogation, in an atmosphere of strengthened enforcement mechanisms. Sudanese authorities refused to hand him over to the court, as did neighboring countries he visited (Chad and Kenya), starkly the revealing the limits of international justice in the context of state sovereignty. While there is no chance that a global police form will emerge any time soon, the value of the evolutionist position is that it points out areas where global terrorism has exposed gaps in existing law. 41 Wilson, supra, 6-7.
Second, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been invoked to argue that European courts may try officials in the Bush administration for violating IHL or IHRL.
Universal jurisdiction empowers a national court or international tribunal to try a citizen of a state for serious crimes such as genocide and war crimes, even though the prosecuting state or tribunal has no historical connection to the events. This doctrine existed well before 9/11, and was gaining acceptance during the 1990s when many new experiments in international criminal justice were emerging, including the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the ICC. Not all responses to gaps in the law are positive, from evolutionists' perspective.
The change they most fear is the change in customary international law that might take place if too many states follow the US lead and pass "exception laws." These laws restrict or suspend IHRL for detainees they classify as terrorists, who in practice are often 42 Richard Goldstone, "The Tension between Combating Terrorism and Protecting Civil
Liberties," in Wilson, supra, 158-159 merely their political opponents or disfavored minorities. 44 Indeed, numerous states passed just such laws during the decade following 9/11. Richard Goldstone and others have documented that the UK, India, Russia, the Phillipines, Thailand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia and Indonesia, amother others, cited US behavior as precedent for exception laws restricting or suspending IHRL for detainees. 45 The worry is that each exception law risks contributing to the establishment of new, more permissive, customary law. As Richard Goldstone put it, "What is of particular concern is that this violation of international law…might well weaken the Geneva Conventions and be used to justify similar violations by other countries."
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Goldsmith and Posner concur with Goldstone on the possibility that US behavior might change customary law, but seem less unnerved by the prospect. They suggest that every state action inconsistent with existing international law "might be said to be a counter-terrorism, but the value of that change will depend on a retrospective moral judgment by an unspecified observer, according to unstated moral assumptions. This pragmatic take on change sees international law less as a codification of shared norms than as an instrument of power. For Goldstone and other evolutionists, however, it is precisely the consolidation of power in the Executive that post-9/11 international jurisprudence sought to curtail. The evolutionist would object that when violations come to be seen merely as proposals, when the exception is no longer regarded as exceptional, the rule of law becomes meaningless.
While evolutionary theory recognizes that international jurisprudence must, in some cases, develop new law, it argues that any new law must be developed according to the general principles that organize existing IHL and IHRL, and insists that the existing law will generally suffice to meet the challenges posed by global terrorism.
The Right to Recognition After 9/11
The attempt to strip terrorist suspects of legal personality became evident in the Bush administration's denial of fair trial rights, in particular the right of habeas corpus.
In habeas to "unlawful enemy combatants," a designation found nowhere in IHL but applied at the discretion of the Executive.
As the restriction of habeas corpus makes clear, legal personality is associated with a cluster of other rights, which it makes necessary, and without which it cannot be observed. These include non-derogable rights listed in the Covenant like the right to life, prohibition of torture and slavery, and prohibition of retroactive criminalization. An important example of a derogable right, the derogation from which is illegitimate because it would invalidate legal personality, is the prohibition of arbitrary and prolonged detention. By 1998, the Human Rights Committee had already determined that, although the prohibition of arbitrary and prolonged detention does not appear in the derogation clause, such detention is nonetheless "incompatible" with the Article 16 right to legal personality, the latter of which is non-derogable. 58 Legal personality is violated when detention is unregulated because then the detainee is at the mercy of his jailers. To be lawful, the detention must not be arbitrary, it must be subject to judicial control, the detainee must have the right to challenge the detention in an independent and impartial court, the detainee must be informed of the charges against him, the detention must be temporary so as not to violate the presumption of innocence, and incommunicado The Obama administration's approach indicates that when it comes to countering terrorism states will proceed with caution regardless of their leaders' political leanings. If the US sets the tone for international custom in the coming decade, what we are likely to see is a general shift from the black hole to the evolutionary approach. This would be a positive development, avoiding both the black hole theory's resistance to the rule of law in counter-terrorism, and the full coverage theory's insistence that existing law is adequate to the unforeseen challenges posed by terrorism.
Evolution is not a radical break. It is a development from within. As international tribunals, councils, and monitoring bodies; national courts; and global civil society organizations have insisted, evolution from within must begin by respecting the principle that everyone has the right to recognition everywhere before the law. 66 Schoettler, supra, 117.
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